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57 
WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES 
Roni A. Elias+ 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1970s, the federal regulation of water pollution has been a vital part 
of the movement to improve the environment. The Clean Water Act1 (“CWA”) was the 
first federal legislation that gave the federal government direct authority to regulate con-
duct for the purpose of controlling and preventing water pollution. Its enactment was a 
vital step in creating uniform national policy to protect water quality and assure the long-
term vitality of the most vital of our natural resources. 
The scope of federal authority to regulate conduct that causes water pollution is de-
fined by the concept of the “waters of the United States.” Simply put, there is extensive, 
long-standing legal support for the principle that the federal government has both the con-
stitutional and statutory authority to take measures to prevent the pollution of the “waters 
of the United States.”2 By the same token, however, there is also extensive legal authority 
supporting the proposition that state and local governments have the primary responsibil-
ity–and power–to regulate land and water use within their borders, and basic constitutional 
principles of federalism require that the federal government.3 At the core of this jurisdic-
tional problem is identifying where the water ends and the land begins. As the Supreme 
Court noted in a decision applying the CWA nearly thirty years ago, this problem is not 
an easy one to solve.4 
The difficulty of finding the jurisdictional boundary between land and water has 
been increased by the Supreme Court’s most recent ruling on CWA jurisdiction in Ra-
panos v. United States Army Corps of Engineers.5 In that case, the Court issued three 
opinions about who had the authority to define this boundary and about what legal princi-
ples should guide the definition. None of these three disparate views commanded a major-
ity of the Court. Consequently, substantial uncertainty remains about how to determine the 
outer limits of federal jurisdiction to prevent pollution in the “waters of the United States.” 
                                                          
 +  I am so blessed & greatly appreciate the love of my life, M.G.S, for her enduring support and continu-
ously making me a better person every day! This Article is dedicated to my parents, Dr.'s Aida & Adil Elias, my 
First Great Teachers In Life. I am truly grateful to the best brother anyone could be blessed to have, my brother, 
Pierre. To the Tulsa Law Review, a heartfelt thank you and gratitude for your efforts, and laser sharp attention to 
detail.   
 1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1948). 
 2. See infra § III. 
 3. See id. 
 4. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 n. 8 (1985). 
 5. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
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The two federal agencies charged with enforcing the CWA, the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (“EPA”) and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps”) 
have recently promulgated regulations revising the regulatory definition of “waters of the 
United States,” and thereby defining the limits of federal authority under the Clean Water 
Act.6 The regulations purport to incorporate the legal principles set forth in Rapanos, as 
well as prior case law, but there are substantial questions about whether the proposed reg-
ulations are, in fact, consistent with established law or whether they reflect an attempt to 
extend the legal boundaries of federal jurisdiction beyond what courts have previously 
approved and what the CWA and the constitution would allow. Those questions are cur-
rently being considered by the Sixth Circuit, which has issued a stay of the implementation 
of the proposed regulations while it considers challenges to them asserted by several state 
governments.7 
This paper argues that the regulations proposed last year are inconsistent with estab-
lished law, including both the text of the CWA itself and the constitutional limits on   fed-
eral authority to regulate land and water use. The body of law regarding the federal au-
thority to regulate water use has always depended upon the proposition that the federal 
government may only regulate those bodies of water that have a regular, tangible, physical 
connection to waters that can be used in interstate navigation.8 The regulations proposed 
by the EPA and the Army Corps go far beyond that limitation, extending federal authority 
over virtually the entire ecosystem that can affect the navigable waters, which includes 
virtually all of the land and water in every corner of the United States. As promulgated, 
these regulations would make the EPA and the Army Corps the primary regulators of land 
and water use throughout the United States, and their regulatory authority would be exer-
cised only with regard to whether such uses would prevent or contribute to water pollution. 
While the prevention of water pollution is certainly a vitally important consideration, it 
cannot and must not be the only consideration in regulating land and water use in all of the 
diverse communities and localities across the country.  State and local governments must 
retain their traditional leading role in regulating land and water use. 
This paper makes this argument in Part I by outlining the regulations proposed by 
the EPA and the Army Corps in 2015 and identifying the principal criticisms of those 
regulations. In Part II, it reviews the statutory framework of the CWA, which creates the 
authority for the agencies to define the “waters of the United States.” In Part III, this paper 
examines how case law, both before and after the CWA, has defined the scope of federal 
authority to regulate water use, and it notes that, until the new regulations, federal law has 
always recognized that the federal government may only regulate waters that have a sig-
nificant, physical connection to the navigable waters. Finally, in Part IV, it more closely 
examines the main arguments against the legality of the new regulations and demonstrates 
that those regulations are both bad law and bad policy. 
                                                          
 6. See generally, Clean Water Rule: Definition of Waters of the United States, 80 FED. REG. 37054, 37056-
57 (2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328 and scattered sections of 40 C.F.R.). 
 7. See Ohio v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 803 F.3d 804, 805 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 8. See infra § III. 
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I. THE NEW REGULATORY DEFINITION OF “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” AND ITS 
CRITICS 
In 2015, the EPA and the Army Corps promulgated a new regulatory definition of 
the “waters of the United States” that was guided by the ruling in Rapanos, as well as by 
policy and scientific considerations.9 The general objective of the regulation was to pro-
vide more predictable agency decision-making about which kinds of waters and wetlands 
would fall within federal jurisdiction.10 Thus, the regulatory definition established certain 
categories of waters that would always fall within CWA jurisdiction, and it sought to di-
minish the circumstances under which jurisdictional decisions would turn on case-specific 
factors.11 In addition, the agencies sought to incorporate a concept that had been crucial 
in the most recent Supreme Court decisions on the limits of federal power under the CWA: 
the idea that the CWA only authorized the federal government to regulate bodies of water 
or other environmental features that had a “significant nexus” with interstate waters that 
were actually navigable or were capable of being modified to accommodate navigation.12 
As the agencies explained when first publishing the regulation: 
The first three types of jurisdictional waters, traditional navigable 
waters, interstate waters, and the territorial seas, are jurisdictional by rule 
in all cases. The fourth type of water, impoundments of jurisdictional 
waters, is also jurisdictional by rule in all cases. The next two types of 
waters, ‘‘tributaries’’ and ‘‘adjacent’’ waters, are jurisdictional by rule, 
as defined, because the science confirms that they have a significant 
nexus to traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, or territorial seas. 
For waters that are jurisdictional by rule, no additional analysis is re-
quired. 
The final two types of jurisdictional waters are those waters found 
after a case-specific analysis to have a significant nexus to traditional 
navigable waters, interstate waters, or the territorial seas, either alone or 
in combination with similarly situated waters in the region. Justice Ken-
nedy acknowledged the agencies could establish more specific regula-
tions or establish a significant nexus on a case-by-case basis, and for 
these waters the agencies will continue to assess significant nexus on a 
case-specific basis.13 
The new regulations employed this concept of “significant nexus” to include a broad cat-
egory of “waters,” many of which had not previously been included within the concept of 
“waters of the United States.” For example, the regulations extended federal jurisdiction 
to “all tributaries” to interstate waters and the territorial seas, with “tributary” defined to 
mean a water that contributes any “flow” whatsoever, “either directly or through another 
water,” to an actual interstate or navigable water, and that “is characterized by the presence 
                                                          
 9. Clean Water Rule: Definition of Waters of the United States, supra note 6, at 37056-57. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. at 37060-61. 
 13. Id. at 37058. 
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of the physical indicators of a bed and banks and an ordinary high water mark,” and with-
out regard to various constructed or natural breaks.14 Given this definition, something 
could constitute a “tributary” even if it was “intermittent[ ] or ephemeral.”15 Moreover, 
the “flow” required to meet the definitional requirements for a tributary need not go di-
rectly to a navigable water. The new regulations contemplate that “to meet the rule’s def-
inition of ‘tributary,’ a water must flow directly or through another water or waters to a 
traditional navigable water, interstate water, or the territorial seas.”16 That is, “[a] tributary 
may contribute flow through any number of downstream waters, including non-jurisdic-
tional features. . . .”17 Thus, “non-jurisdictional features”—–things that were within the 
traditional province of state and local authority—–could still fall within federal jurisdiction 
if there was even an intermittent flow of water through them that was related to a flow of 
water that reached a navigable body of water. 
The new regulations also found a “significant nexus” between the navigable waters 
and wetlands or other “waters” that were “adjacent” to the navigable waters.18 Thus, the 
regulations defined “waters of the United States” to include “[a]ll waters adjacent to” any 
traditional navigable or interstate water, and to any “tributary” as so defined by the new 
regulations.19 The new regulations further defined “adjacent” to mean not only “border-
ing,” or “contiguous,” but also “neighboring.”20 “Neighboring” was defined to include not 
only “[a]ll waters within 100 feet of the ordinary high water mark” of such a water, as well 
as “[a]ll waters” within 1,500 feet of the “ordinary high water mark of such water” and 
within the 100-year floodplain of such water and “all waters” within 1,500 feet of the 
ordinary high water mark of the Great Lakes, or of the high tide line of a traditional navi-
gable waterway or territorial sea.21 The new regulations also noted that “[t]he entire water 
is neighboring if a portion is located within 1,500 feet of the ordinary high water mark and 
within the 100-year floodplain.”22 
Through their expansive definition of “tributary” and their broadly drawn concept 
of adjacency, the new regulations would extend federal jurisdiction to “waters” and other 
features that are dry land most of the time, even when these feature are located as far as 
1,500 feet from even “ephemeral” creek beds that are usually dry. The new regulations 
also would have potentially extended CWA jurisdiction to “[a]ll waters” within the 100-
year floodplain of a traditional navigable or interstate water or territorial sea and to “all 
waters located within 4,000 feet of the high tide line or ordinary high water mark” of any 
such water or of a “tributary” if “they are determined on a case-specific basis to have a 
significant nexus” to a traditional navigable or interstate water or territorial sea.23 To be 
                                                          
 14. 33 C.F.R. 328.3(c)(3) (1986). 
 15. Clean Water Rule: Definition of Waters of the United States, supra note 6, at 37076. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(6) (1986). 
 19. See id. 
 20. 33 C.F.R. 328.3(c)(1) (1986). 
 21. 33 C.F.R. 328.3(c)(2) (1986). 
 22. Id. 
 23. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. 328.3(a)(8) (1986). 
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sure the new regulation excludes a few such things as certain swimming pools (those “cre-
ated in dry land”) and “puddles” (defined as “very small, shallow, and highly transitory 
pool[s] of water that form[s] on pavement or uplands during or immediately after a rain-
storm or similar precipitation event”).24 Even so, the new regulations greatly expanded 
federal jurisdiction over a number of areas that had long been considered within the ex-
clusive province of state and local government. Moreover, the regulations also gave the 
Army Corps and the EPA extensive discretion to define a wide variety of environmental 
features as falling within the scope of CWA jurisdiction. 
The new regulatory definition was hardly acclaimed as a solution to the long-stand-
ing problem of establishing reasonable and cognizable limits to CWA jurisdiction.  The 
attorneys general of Ohio and Michigan sued the Army Corps in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Ohio immediately after the issuance of the rule, alleging 
generally that the new definition of “waters of the United States” exceeded the authority 
conveyed by the CWA and was inconsistent with the principles upon which Supreme 
Court opinions such as SWANCC and Rapanos were based.25 In particular, the attorneys 
general were concerned with the intrusion of federal power into areas previously reserved 
for state and local authority, especially the regulation of land use and intrastate waters.26 
In this connection, they expressed concern that the regulations would give the federal gov-
ernment the power to inappropriately supplant state and local authority. Their complaint 
expressed this concern in terms of an example of an Ohio or Michigan property owner 
who wanted to fix “a depression in her yard that can fill with water in heavy rains.”27 They 
noted that, under the new regulations, this ordinary home repair could come within federal 
jurisdiction and be subject to the federal permitting process “should the area be in a flood-
plain and anywhere within 1,500 feet of even a usually dry stream bed that can be deemed 
to connect with some other such feature that connects somehow with other similar land 
features that may on occasion take water to a tributary of a river or lake that actually is a 
navigable or interstate water.”28 
The lawsuit by Michigan and Ohio coincided by legal actions taken by other states 
and private groups, all of which challenged the legality of the proposed regulations.29 In 
general, all of these lawsuits involved allegations that the regulations purported to create 
federal authority beyond the limits permitted by the text of the CWA and the Constitu-
tion.30 To understand whether and to what extent these allegations make a compelling case 
against the legality of the new definition of “waters of the United States,” it is necessary 
to consider the framework of the CWA. 
                                                          
 24. See, e.g., 33 C.F.R. 328.3(b)(4)(iii) (1986) (vii); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(2)(iv)(C) (1980),(G); Clean Water 
Rule: Definition of Waters of the United States, supra note 6 at 37099. 
 25. See Complaint, Ohio v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, Case No. 2:15-cv-02467 (S.D. Ohio), 
available at http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Files/Briefing-Room/News-Releases/Environmental-Enforce-
ment/2015-06-29-WOTUS-Complaint-%28as-filed%29.aspx. 
 26. Id. at 42-49. 
 27. Id. at ¶ 7. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Ohio v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 803 F.3d 804, 805 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 30. See id. 
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II. THE CWA’S STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
The CWA was the product of evolving federal legislation designed to protect the 
navigability of interstate waters. The first precursor of the CWA and the first federal leg-
islation designed to promote clean water was the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.31 In this 
legislation, Congress sought to prevent the discharge of trash into navigable waterways.32 
The Rivers and Harbors Act contemplated water pollution as a threat to navigation–not as 
a threat to environmental quality–because using rivers, harbors, and bays as waste disposal 
sites obstructed waterways that were essential for both commercial and military pur-
poses.33 Thus, the Rivers and Harbors Act was tailored to permit the federal government 
to prevent such obstructions to the waterways that could be used for navigation. 
The first federal legislation to address pollution as a problem of environmental qual-
ity was the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 (“FWCPA”).34 Under this statu-
tory scheme, the federal government would fund research regarding water pollution and 
would provide loans that states could use to build water treatment plants.35 Through this 
statutory scheme, the FWCPA reflected the traditional understanding of water resource 
management as a function of state government; it placed the primary responsibility for 
pollution control with state authorities, and the federal government only provided research 
and funding that facilitated the development of state policies and programs for managing 
water pollution. Unfortunately, the FWCPA was not terribly effective at promoting better 
water pollution control. Even with amendments gratfted on to the legislation after its initial 
enactment, the FWCPA proved largely ineffective, as water quality did not significantly 
improve as a result of its program.36 
The need for more effective water pollution policies became a particular focus of 
public and political attention in the late 1960s, with the burgeoning environmental move-
ment and the occurrence of two highly publicized environmental disasters affecting water 
resources. In January 1969, a “blowout” beneath an oil-drilling platform off the California 
coast near Santa Barbara sent over 3 million gallons of crude oil into the Pacific Ocean, 
resulting in “waves so thick with crude oil that they broke on shore with an eerie silence. 
Thirty miles of sandy beaches coated with thick sludge. Hundreds of miles of ocean cov-
ered with an oily black sheen.”37 Six months later, an oil slick on the surface of the Cuya-
hoga River in Cleveland caught fire, damaging two bridges, and the news coverage of that 
                                                          
 31. Act of Mar. 3, 1899, Ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2000)). 
 32. See JOEL M. GROSS & LYNN DODGE, CLEAN WATER ACT 5 (2005). 
 33. Id. 
 34. P.L. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155. 
 35. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 32, at 5-6. 
 36. Id. at 6. 
 37. Miles Corwin, The Oil Spill Heard ‘Round the Country!, L.A. TIMES, January 28, 1989, at I23, 
http://www2.bren.ucsb.edu/~dhardy/1969_Santa_Barbara_Oil_Spill/Home.html. 
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event provided a dramatic accent to the problems of water pollution.38 Indeed, Cleveland’s 
“burning river” even became the subject of a popular song.39 
In the wake of these events, and the inaugural Earth Day in 1970, a subcommittee 
of the Senate Committee on Public Works convened hearings on the problem of water 
pollution.40 In 1972, relying on the Senate Committee’s findings, Congress amended the 
FWPCA to authorize more direct federal action addressing water pollution.41 President 
Nixon vetoed these amendments, but Congress overrode the veto, and the amended 
FWPCA became known as the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).42 
Congress announced the policy objectives behind the CWA in its text, and the text 
of the CWA also focused on the concept as “navigable waters” as the subject of federal 
regulation. At the most fundamental level, the CWA was intended to “restore and maintain 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”43 Congress sought 
to achieve this overarching objective by reaching certain specifically enumerated goals, 
which included, among things: eliminating the discharge of pollution into the “navigable 
waters” of the United States by 1985;44 prohibiting the discharge of “toxic pollutants in 
toxic amounts;”45 providing federal financial assistance to the construction of publicly 
owned wastewater treatment facilities;46 promoting the development and implementation 
of “waste treatment management planning processes” in every state;47  funding research 
and the development of technology “necessary to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into 
the navigable waters, waters of the contiguous zone, and the oceans;”48 developing and 
implementing “programs for the control of nonpoint sources of pollution . . . in an expedi-
tious manner so as to enable the goals of this chapter to be met through the control of both 
point and nonpoint sources of pollution.”49 
Towards these objectives, the CWA prohibited any discharge of pollutants into nav-
igable waters without certain permits.50 The required permits were available through two 
programs that were created by the CWA: the “National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System” (“NPDES”)51; and “permits for dredged or fill material,” commonly known as 
                                                          
 38. MICHAEL ROTMAN, CUYAHOGA RIVER FIRE, available athttp://clevelandhistorical.org/items/show/63#. 
VY7MNGCprzI (last accessed June 27, 2015) Some of the most sensational publicity about the Cuyahoga 
River Fire came from Time Magazine, which reported on the 1969 fire and on water pollution issues generally 
in its issue of August 1, 1969. That issue featured a photograph of the burning Cuyahoga River on the cover; 
but the photograph was actually from a fire that occurred there in 1952;  Jonathan Adler, The Fable of the 
Burning River, 45 Years Later, WASH. POST, June 22, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost .com /news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/06/22/the-fable-of-the-burning-river-45-years-later. 
 39. Randy Newman, Burn On, SAIL AWAY (1972). 
 40. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 32, at 6. 
 41. ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER 2-7 (1993). 
 42. Id. at 2; GROSS & DODGE, supra note 32, at 6. 
 43. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1948). 
 44. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1948) 
 45. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(3) (1948) 
 46. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1948) 
 47. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(5) (1948) 
 48. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6) (1948) 
 49. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(7) (1948) 
 50. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1948) 
 51. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1948) 
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“Section 404 permits.”52 Through this regulatory framework, the CWA essentially estab-
lished two categories of water pollution: the discharge of pollutants, such as toxic sub-
stances, into water; and the placement of “dredged or fill material” into water.  Federal 
regulations define “dredged material” as “material that is excavated or dredged from wa-
ters of the United States.”53 Those regulations also define “fill material” as material that 
“[r]eplac[es] any portion of a water of the United States with dry land”54 or that 
“[c]hang[es] the bottom elevation of any portion of a water of the United States.”55 
The two different kinds of permits are issued by separate federal agencies. The CWA 
gave the EPA primary authority over NPDES permits, and it created a mechanism by 
which the EPA can delegate its NPDES permitting authority to state agencies.56 Permits 
relating to “dredged or fill material” fall within the authority of the Army Corps.57 
III. THE INTERPRETATION OF “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” BEFORE AND AFTER 
THE CWA 
A. The Established Understanding of the Limits of Federal Power over Water 
Resources When the CWA Was Enacted 
Of course, the definition of “waters of the United States” for the purposes of the 
CWA does not occur in a vacuum. There is an extensive history of the federal regulation 
of certain waters in the United States, and this history necessarily informs the interpreta-
tion of the operative concepts in the CWA and its attendant regulations. A review of the 
historical use of the concept of “waters of the United States” reveals that the term has 
traditionally applied to waters that were actually capable of being used in navigation and 
their tributaries that had a significant flow into such navigable waters. 
Because the terms “waters of the United States” and “navigable waters” are legal 
terms of art, Congress’ use of these terms in the CWA creates a presumption that, in the 
context of the statute, these terms incorporated this established judicial meaning.58  Con-
gress’ regulation of the “navigable waters” and the “waters of the United States” is a func-
tion of the authority granted to it under the Commerce Clause.59 It is axiomatic that the 
                                                          
 52. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1948) 
 53. 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(c) (1986). 
 54. 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(e)(1)(i) (1986). 
 55. 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(e)(1)(ii) (1986). The substances that constitute “fill material” include, but are not lim-
ited to: “rock, sand, soil, clay, plastics, construction debris, wood chips, overburden from mining or other exca-
vation activities, and materials used to create any structure or infrastructure in the waters of the United States.” 
33 C.F.R. § 323.3(e)(2) (1986). “The term fill material does not include trash or garbage.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(e)(3) 
(1986). 
 56. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1948) For a state to obtain authority to issue permits under this program, the gover-
nor must submit to the Administrator of the EPA a description of the proposed program and “a statement from 
the attorney general . . . that the laws of such State, or the interstate compact[,] . . . provide adequate authority to 
carry out the described program. The Administrator shall approve each . . . program unless he deter- mines that 
adequate authority does not exist.” 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1948) 
 57. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1948). 
 58. Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 813 (1989) (“[w]hen Congress codifies a judicially 
defined concept, it is presumed, absent an express statement to the contrary, that Congress intended to adopt the 
interpretation placed on that concept by the courts.”); see also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 
696-97 (1979). 
 59. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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federal government has the constitutional authority “to secure the uninterrupted navigabil-
ity of all navigable streams within the limits of the United States” as an aspect of its power 
to regulate interstate commerce.60 Thus, the Supreme Court has held that “the jurisdiction 
of the general government over interstate commerce and its natural highways vests in that 
government the right to take all needed measures to preserve the navigability of the navi-
gable water courses of the country.”61 The collection of navigable water courses is under-
stood as an essentially unitary system, being described by the Court as a “continued high-
way” that is essential to the continuation and development of interstate commerce.62 
In regulating this “continued highway,” the federal government’s primary objective 
is to prevent “any interference with the country’s water assets” and to assure that the nav-
igable waters always have a sufficient flow of water to permit their use in interstate com-
merce.63 The need to protect the flow of water throughout the entire system of navigable 
waters means that federal authority over navigable waters may extend to non-navigable 
waters, such as tributaries of navigable waters, that are physically connected to the navi-
gable waters and that are capable of being actually navigable in the future, through im-
provements that are reasonably anticipated in the ordinary course of events.64 In addition, 
the federal government may regulate those tributaries of navigable waters that are not nav-
igable now and not anticipated to become navigable, but only to the extent necessary to 
protect the capacity and integrity of the channels of navigation.65 In this way, the concept 
of the “navigable waters” and the “waters of the United States” has always presupposed 
some degree of federal authority over bodies of water that exist entirely within state bound-
aries. 
Because this aspect of federal regulatory power has the potential to intrude upon 
state prerogatives, it has always been accepted that the extension of federal authority over 
non-navigable bodies of water must be limited so that it does not intrude upon state power 
to regulate water. Federal courts have long recognized that the general power to regulate 
water use is an essential aspect of the sovereign power of state governments.66  The states 
retain “total authority over [their] internal waters,” except where the federal government 
has specifically reserved enumerated regulatory power, such as the power to regulate nav-
igation.67 But even here, the extension of federal authority must be carefully drawn to 
avoid unnecessary incursions upon the states’ primary power to regulate land and water 
use.68 Thus, the federal government can regulate intrastate waters only as necessary to 
protect the integrity of the aquatic system that constitutes the navigable waters.69 
                                                          
 60. Id. 
 61. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899). 
 62. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1870). 
 63. See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 405-08 (1940). 
 64. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563; Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 406. 
 65. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 525 (1941); see also United States v. 
Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 232 (1960). 
 66. See Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 375-76 (1977); United 
States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 717 (1950). 
 67. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 662 (1978) (citing Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 
at 709). 
 68. California, 438 U.S. at 645. 
 69. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 423-26 (discussing federal authority to regulate hydroelectric 
power plants in light of their effect on the flow of water in the navigable waters); see also United States v. Gerlach 
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The text of the CWA makes it clear that Congress understood this legal background, 
which established that its power to regulate the “navigable waters” and the “waters of the 
United States” was limited and that it could not be defined so that it intruded upon the 
inherent, sovereign power of state governments to regulate the use of property and the use 
of water. In its introductory section, where it defines its fundamental policies and objec-
tives, the CWA makes it clear that it is not intended to intrude on state sovereignty. Thus, 
the CWA provides: 
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to allocate 
quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abro-
gated or otherwise impaired by this chapter. It is the further policy of 
Congress that nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or 
abrogate rights to quantities of water which have been established by any 
State. Federal agencies shall co-operate with State and local agencies to 
develop comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pol-
lution in concert with programs for managing water resources.70 
The CWA and the legal background against which it is written mean that the con-
cepts of “navigable waters” and “waters of the United States” are definitely limited in 
scope. The historical use of these terms and the language of the CWA itself both establish 
unequivocally that “waters of the United States” cannot be read to mean “any water in the 
United States.” Rather, that term, and its companion term, “navigable waters” refer to bod-
ies of water that can be navigated or that affect the navigability of bodies of water that can 
be navigated. In other words, the CWA regulates waters that are actually navigable and 
their significant tributaries. By the same token, the CWA cannot be read to apply to bodies 
of water that do not have a substantial effect on the navigable waters and their tributaries. 
B. The Evolution of CWA Regulations and the Gradual Expansion of Federal 
Authority 
The regulations attendant to the CWA initially reflected a keen appreciation of the 
importance of the traditional concept of “waters of the United States” in defining CWA 
jurisdiction. In the immediate aftermath of the CWA’s enactment, the regulations provided 
that the CWA applied only to waters that were navigable in fact.71 In 1975, however, the 
Army Corps issued interim final regulations redefining “waters of the United States” to 
include not only actually navigable waters but also tributaries of such waters, interstate 
waters and their tributaries, and non-navigable intrastate waters whose use or misuse could 
affect interstate commerce.72 Thus, the limits of CWA jurisdiction appeared to coincide 
with the limits of Congress’ commerce power.73 
                                                          
Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950) (discussing federal authority to regulate water use in connection with the 
reclamation of water resources in arid western states, in light of the nexus between those reclamation projects 
and the preservation of the flow of water in interstate waters); see generally,  Roderick E. Walston, The Federal 
Commerce and Navigation Powers: Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County’s Undecided Constitutional 
Issue, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 699 (2002). 
 70. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (1948). 
 71. 40 FED. REG. 31320 (1975). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 723-24 (discussing the evolution of the jurisdictional regulations under the CWA). 
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As a part of this extension of CWA jurisdiction, the Army Corps construed the CWA 
to cover all “freshwater wetlands” that were adjacent to other covered waters.74 The reg-
ulations defined a “freshwater wetland” as an area that is “periodically inundated” and is 
“normally characterized by the prevalence of vegetation that requires saturated soil condi-
tions for growth and reproduction.”75 In 1977, the Corps refined its definition of wetlands 
by eliminating the reference to periodic inundation and making other minor changes.76 
This definition has persisted in substance.77 
Eventually, the Army Corps sought to extend its regulation to areas whose connec-
tion to the navigable waters was more intangible. Specifically, the regulations were broad-
ened to that the “waters of the United States” was defined to include any water that would 
serve as a habitat for migratory birds.78 In addition, the Army Corps interpreted its own 
regulations to include “ephemeral streams” and “drainage ditches” as “tributaries” that are 
part of the “waters of the United States,”79, as long as they have a perceptible “ordinary 
high water mark.”80 
C. The Supreme Court’s Correction of the Expansion of CWA Regulatory Authority 
As CWA jurisdiction expanded to apply to apply beyond the navigable waters and 
their significant tributaries, questions arose about whether the EPA and Army Corps were 
exceeding the boundaries of federal power. In particular, these questions arose in cases 
where the asserted federal jurisdiction was founded on the concept of “adjacency” to nav-
igable waters and their tributaries. These questions were most prominently considered in 
two cases in the Supreme Court, which established the principle that a non-navigable water 
could fall within CWA jurisdiction only when that water had a substantial physical con-
nection with a navigable water. 
The Supreme Court first addressed the scope of CWA jurisdiction over wetlands in 
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.81 There, a developer sought to fill eighty 
acres of low-lying marshy land in Michigan near Lake St. Clair.82 This circumstance im-
plicated the regulatory definition of “wetland” and the question whether federal jurisdic-
tion was limited to wetlands that were inundated by flooding from bodies of navigable 
water.83 
In Riverside Bayview, the Sixth Circuit had held that the regulatory definition of 
wetlands should be construed to include only wetlands that were subject to flooding by 
                                                          
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. (discussing 33 CFR § 209.120(d)(2)(h) (1976)). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. 51 FED. REG. 41217. 
 79. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 725 (discussing 33 CFR § 328.3(a)(5) (1986)). 
 80. Id. (citing 65 FED. REG. 12823 (2000)). 
 81. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
 82. Id. at 123-24. Lake St. Clair is a large inland lake, northeast of Detroit, lying between Lake Huron and 
Lake Erie, and it is connected to Lake Erie by the Detroit River.  It is bounded by both Michigan and Ontario, 
Canada. There was no dispute in the case that Lake St. Clair was a waterway that could be a part of interstate 
and/or international commerce. 
 83. Id. 
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adjacent navigable waters at a frequency sufficient to support the growth of aquatic vege-
tation.84 According to the Sixth Circuit, any more expansive definition of wetlands might 
result in the taking of private property without just compensation.85 The Sixth Circuit also 
took the position that, when enacting the CWA, Congress intended only to allow regulation 
of wetlands that were the result of flooding by navigable waters.86 Consequently, the Sixth 
Circuit concluded that the property at issue was not within CWA jurisdiction because its 
semiaquatic characteristics were not the result of frequent flooding by the nearby naviga-
ble waters.87 
In reviewing the Sixth Circuit’s ruling, the Supreme Court first considered whether 
the Army Corps had the authority under the CWA to promulgate a regulation that defined 
“waters of the United States” to be a wetland adjacent to a navigable water.88 It began its 
answer by noting that CWA jurisdiction must extend beyond the waters that were actually 
navigable, and that such jurisdiction must include non-navigable tributaries that fed the 
navigable waters “because the discharge of pollutants must be controlled at its source.”89 
The Court concluded that the CWA could apply to non-navigable waters and to wetlands 
adjacent to navigable waters because all of these were part of a hydrologic system that 
determined the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the navigable waters.90 
Thus, the Court reiterated the basic principle governing the extension of federal authority 
over non-navigable waters, including purely intrastate waters – that such waters could be 
regulated to the extent that they had a substantial physical connection to navigable waters 
so that pollutants in them would flow to the navigable waters. 
The Court also considered whether, for the purpose of applying the applicable reg-
ulation, the source of water that inundated a wetland was relevant to determining whether 
it was “adjacent” to a navigable water.91 The Court’s answer to the first question deter-
mined its answer to the second question. Because “wetlands may affect the water quality 
of adjacent lakes, rivers, and streams even when the waters of those bodies do not actually 
inundate the wetlands,” the Riverside Bayview Court concluded that adjacent wetlands 
were covered by the CWA, regardless of the source of water that made them wetlands, as 
long as such waters were “inseparably bound up” with the navigable waters.92 Here again, 
the Court emphasized the importance of close, tangible, physical connection between the 
navigable waters and any regulated waters. 
The Riverside Bayview Court noted an important limitation on its holding, which 
arose from the unique circumstances of the wetlands adjacent to Lake St. Clair, an open 
body of navigable water: “[w]e are not called upon to address the question of the authority 
of the Corps to regulate discharges of fill material into wetlands that are not adjacent to 
                                                          
 84. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 729 F.2d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 1984). 
 85. Id. at 396-97. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132-34. 
 89. Id. at 133. 
 90. Id. at 134. 
 91. Id. at 134-35. 
 92. Id. at 134-35 
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bodies of open water.”93 The Court also noted that it would not be easy to decide the 
question of where to draw the boundary between waters that were regulated by the CWA 
and purely intrastate waters, not to mention the boundary between “waters of the United 
States” and intrastate land. In identifying this difficult question, the Court keenly antici-
pated the nature of the problem that would be at the center of jurisprudence about CWA 
jurisdiction in the coming decades: 
In determining the limits of its power to regulate discharges under the 
Act, the Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water ends 
and land begins. Our common experience tells us that this is often no 
easy task: the transition from water to solid ground is not necessarily or 
even typically an abrupt one. Rather, between open waters and dry land 
may lie shallows, marshes, mudflats, swamps, bogs—in short, a huge 
array of areas that are not wholly aquatic but nevertheless fall far short 
of being dry land. Where on this continuum to find the limit of “waters” 
is far from obvious.94 
In 2001, the Court built upon the principles set forth in Riverside Bayview when it 
issued its next significant decision regarding the scope of authority under the CWA in 
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs 
(“SWANCC”).95 There, the Court considered whether the Army Corps had the authority 
under the CWA to promulgate a regulation that extended CWA jurisdiction over isolated 
inland ponds.96 In answering this question, the Court established a category of intrastate 
waters that was categorically excluded from federal authority. 
The particular regulation at issue in the case was the so-called “Migratory Bird 
Rule,”97 which defined the waters of the United States to include any water that actually 
served or that might serve as a habitat for migratory birds or endangered species.98 The 
regulation was triggered when a county waste disposal agency in Illinois, the Solid Waste 
Agency of Northern Cook County, purchased an abandoned mining site to use as a disposal 
location for nonhazardous solid wastes.99 The property included some permanent and sea-
sonal “ponds” that had been formed when water filled man-made holes created in connec-
tion with the former mining operations.100 
The agency wanted to fill the ponds, but the Army Corps asserted federal jurisdiction 
under the CWA because the ponds were habitats for migratory birds.101 The agency sued, 
challenging the legality of the Migratory Bird Rule, and arguing that the CWA did not 
give the Army Corps authority over isolated, man-made ponds that happened to be wildlife 
habitats.102 The Army Corps maintained that, under Riverside Bayview, the CWA should 
be read to give it regulatory authority over any body of water, as long as such regulation 
                                                          
 93. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 131 n. 8. 
 94. Id. at 132. 
 95. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County,531 U.S. at 159. 
 96. Id. at 168-69. 
 97. 51 FED. REG. 41217. 
 98. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 531 U.S. at 164. 
 99. Id. at 162-63. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 164-65. 
 102. Id.   
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was undertaken for the same general ecological purposes of the CWA, such as maintaining 
the biological integrity of aquatic systems.103 
The SWANCC Court rejected the Army Corps’ arguments and ruled that the Migra-
tory Bird Rule was invalid because it exceeded the scope of regulatory authority created 
by the CWA.104 The Court reasoned that fundamental purpose of the CWA was to protect 
waters and aquatic ecosystems, including wetlands, which had a “significant nexus” with 
navigable waters.105 It is clear that SWANCC’s concept of “significant nexus” is derived 
from the idea expressed in Riverside Bayview that the CWA covered only waters that were 
“inseparably bound up” with “navigable waters.”106 Because the isolated ponds at issue in 
SWANCC did not have this kind of connection to navigable waters, the Court held that 
they could not be regulated by the Army Corps. 
But, even more fundamentally, the Court held that the Army Corps lacked the au-
thority to promulgate a regulation that founded CWA jurisdiction over any category of 
environmental features upon something other than a hydrological connection with the nav-
igable waters.107 The opinion in SWANCC emphasized that the crucial factor in determin-
ing the scope of CWA jurisdiction was the relationship between the object of regulation 
and the cleanliness of the navigable waters. This opinion clarified that the CWA did not 
provide wide-ranging authority to protect all aspects of aquatic ecosystems. Rather it was 
designed to protect the navigable waters from pollution, and its reach could extend only to 
“waters” that flowed to the navigable waters and could thereby convey pollution to the 
navigable waters. 
In addition, SWANCC made it clear that the hydrological connection upon which 
CWA jurisdiction was based had to be “significant.”108 A connection was significant for 
CWA purposes when the condition of the non-navigable water or wetland would have a 
significant effect on the cleanliness or biological integrity of the navigable waters.109 
SWANCC also supported the conclusion that a water would not be covered by the CWA if 
it merely had some effect on an ecosystem that included a navigable water.110 Because the 
CWA was concerned with water pollution, the nexus between a non-navigable water or 
wetland and the navigable waters had to concern the cleanliness and biological integrity 
of the navigable waters, not some other ecological factor.111 
C. Rapanos and the Ensuing Confusion over the Scope of Federal Authority 
Five years after the decision in SWANCC, two consolidated cases from Michigan 
presented a question about the meaning and application of the concept of “significant 
                                                          
 103.  Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 531 U.S. at 168-69. 
 104. Id. at 171-72. 
 105. Id. at 167. 
 106. See id. (quoting Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134). 
 107. Id. at 172-73. 
 108. Id. at 167. 
 109. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 531 U.S. at 167. 
 110. Id. at 168-69. 
 111. Id. 
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nexus” in the context of CWA authority over wetlands “adjacent” to the navigable wa-
ters.112 These cases arose from the Army Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over several dif-
ferent kinds of wetlands, with varying types and degrees of connection to the navigable 
waters. They provided an opportunity for the Court to conclusively assert the meaning of 
SWANCC in the context of wetlands, but a division of opinion and analysis among the 
Justices resulted in even less clarity than existed before. 
In the first case, Rapanos v. United States,113 the Army Corps had asserted jurisdic-
tion over “54 acres of land with sometimes-saturated soil conditions” near Midland, Mich-
igan.114 The nearest body of navigable water was Saginaw Bay, an inlet of Lake Huron, 
and it was between eleven and twenty miles from the land.115 The landowner sought to 
develop the property, and the Army Corps informed him that he would need a permit to 
do so because the property included wetlands protected by the CWA. Disregarding the 
assertion of federal jurisdiction, the land owner began backfilling the property without a 
permit, and “[t]welve years of criminal and civil litigation ensued.”116 
In the second case, Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,117 a property 
owner sought to develop a nineteen-acre parcel of land, which was about a mile from Lake 
St. Clair, ironically the same body of navigable water involved in Riverside Bayview.118 
The property qualified as a wetland because it collected standing water at certain times of 
the year; and the standing water accumulated because ordinary run-off was prevented by 
the existence of a man-made berm, which ran along the border of the property.119 As the 
Court explained, “[t]he berm is largely or entirely impermeable to water and blocks drain-
age from the wetland, though it may permit occasional overflow to the ditch. The ditch 
empties into another ditch or a drain, which connects to Auvase Creek, which empties into 
Lake St. Clair.”120 
In both cases, the Army Corps had asserted jurisdiction because the wetlands were 
adjacent to navigable waters, and the two district courts and the Sixth Circuit all agreed 
that all of the wetlands involved in both cases fell within the definition of “adjacent” for 
the purposes of the applicable regulations.121 John Rapanos argued that the CWA only 
applied to waters that were actually navigable and therefore that its attendant regulations 
could not assert jurisdiction over any wetlands, whether or not they were adjacent to the 
navigable waters.122 The Carabells made a different argument, contending that the CWA 
                                                          
 112. See United States v. Rapanos, 367 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Carabell v. United States Army Corps 
of Eng’rs, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the two cases in 
Rapanos v. United States, 546 U.S. 932 (2005). This paper will refer to the consolidated cases collectively as 
“Rapanos.” 
 113. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
 114. Id. at 720. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 721. 
 117. Carabell,547 U.S. at 715. 
 118. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 730. 
 119. See id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 729-30. 
 122. Id. at 730-31. 
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could not apply to a wetland that lacked any hydrological connection to the waters of the 
United States.123 
In a plurality opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Thomas and Alito, Justice Scalia assailed the Army Corps for exceeding the limits of fed-
eral jurisdiction established by the use of the terms “navigable waters” and “waters of the 
United States.”124 
In applying the definition to “ephemeral streams,” “wet meadows,” 
storm sewers and culverts, “directional sheet flow during storm events,” 
drain tiles, manmade drainage ditches, and dry arroyos in the middle of 
the desert, the Corps has stretched the term “waters of the United States” 
beyond parody. The plain language of the statute simply does not au-
thorize this “Land Is Waters” approach to federal jurisdiction.125 
Justice Scalia’s opinion emphasized that, in both Riverside Bayview and SWANCC, 
as well as in case law preceding those decisions, the Court had held that the phrase “waters 
of the United States” has a limited effect, and that such a limited effect “includes, at bare 
minimum, the ordinary presence of water.”126 Consequently, a non-navigable body of wa-
ter or a wetland could fall within the definition of the “waters of the United States” only it 
was joined to a navigable body of water by a regular, consistent flow of water.127 
Justice Scalia found this limitation in more than just the meaning of the specific 
phrase “waters of the United States;” he also found it in general considerations of federal-
ism, which were recognized elsewhere in the statute. In this connection, his plurality opin-
ion pointed out that the CWA classifies channels that typically carry water currents inter-
mittently as “point sources,” as distinct from the “navigable waters.”128 Justice Scalia read 
this classification to denote that impermanent or intermittent flows of water, such as 
“ephemeral streams,” “wet meadows,” storm sewers and culverts, “directional sheet flow 
during storm events,” and others,129 must be distinguished from “navigable waters.”130 
Moreover, this limited reading of federal authority under the CWA was important to pre-
serving the traditional role of the states in regulating land and water use.131  In this con-
nection, he pointed out that one of the stated purpose of the statute was to preserve the 
traditional role of the states as the primary source of authority for both regulating land and 
water use and preventing pollution.132 
This led the plurality to its conclusion about the scope of CWA jurisdiction over 
wetlands. Justice Scalia explained: 
[O]nly those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies 
that are “waters of the United States” in their own right, so that there is 
                                                          
 123.  Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739-40. 
 124. Id. at 734. 
 125. Id.   
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 734-35. 
 128.  Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 735 (citing 33 U.S.C. at § 1362 (14) (1948). 
 129.  Id. at 734. 
 130. Id. at 735. 
 131. Id. at 737. 
 132. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1948)). 
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no clear demarcation between “waters” and wetlands, are “adjacent to” 
such waters and covered by the Act. Wetlands with only an intermittent, 
physically remote hydrologic connection to “waters of the United 
States” do not implicate the boundary-drawing problem of Riverside 
Bayview, and thus lack the necessary connection to covered waters that 
we described as a “significant nexus” in SWANCC . . . Thus, establish-
ing that wetlands such as those at the Rapanos and Carabell sites are 
covered by the Act requires two findings: first, that the adjacent channel 
contains a “wate[r] of the United States,” (i. e., a relatively permanent 
body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters); and 
second, that the wetland has a continuous surface connection with that 
water, making it difficult to determine where the “water” ends and the 
“wetland” begins.133 
The plurality opinion effectively creates a two-part test for federal jurisdiction over 
wetlands. First, the wetland in question must be “a relatively permanent body of water 
connected to traditional interstate navigable waters.”134 Second, there must be a continu-
ous surface connection between the wetland and the navigable interstate water.135 
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion that stood in equipoise with Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion, commanding the votes of Justices Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg.  
Justice Stevens did not read the statutory language to be as specifically defined as Justice 
Scalia had.136 Consequently, he concluded that terms such as “waters of the United States” 
were broad enough to give agencies such as the Army Corps broad discretion in determin-
ing their meaning and application.137 And he thought that the Army Corps’ application of 
the statute in Rapanos was within the boundaries of that discretionary authority.138 Thus, 
Justice Stevens thought that the Army Corps’ implementation of the CWA fell within the 
broad framework for judicial deference to agency action that was most authoritatively de-
scribed in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.139 
Justice Stevens’ path to Chevron deference began with his reading of the statutory 
terms. Unlike Justice Scalia, he did not read “waters of the United States” as simply a legal 
term of art, which is defined by its historical use by courts and legislatures.140 Rather, 
Justice Stevens saw this statutory term as a reference to a complicated technical issue – 
precisely the sort of technical issue that Congress typically delegates to agency interpreta-
tion and application in the Chevron framework.141 In this respect, Justice Stevens’ ap-
proach to the statute embraces the idea that “waters of the United States” really means 
“ecosystems including the waters of the United States.” Thus, Justice Stevens concludes 
that the statute calls for deference to the agency understanding of whether, how, and to 
what extent a wetland affects an ecosystem that includes a navigable water. 
                                                          
 133. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
 134. Id.   
 135. Id.   
 136. Id. at 787-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. at 792-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 138. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 795-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 139. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 140. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 787-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 141. Id. 
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To support this conclusion, Justice Stevens asserted two principal points. First, he 
noted the long history of congressional acquiescence to the Army Corps’ judgment about 
what should and should not be included in the “waters of the United States.”142 Second, 
he noted that the Court’s decision in Riverside Bayview had specifically called for defer-
ence to reasonable determinations by the Army Corps about what fell within the scope of 
CWA authority.143 As Justice Stevens read it, Riverside Bayview did not stand for the 
proposition that a CWA jurisdiction depended upon the existence of a continuous surface 
water connection; rather, he concluded that Riverside Bayview turned on the Court’s def-
erence to the Army Corps’ judgment about what constituted a water of the United 
States.144 
The third main opinion in Rapanos was written by Justice Kennedy. Although he 
agreed with the plurality’s conclusion that the Sixth Circuit had erred in affirming the 
Army Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction, thereby concurring in the judgment and creating a 
five-vote majority for vacating the judgments below, he departed from Justice Scalia’s 
understanding of the meaning of the statute. His opinion offered an approach to interpret-
ing and applying the CWA that was a kind of combination of both Justice Scalia’s and 
Justice Stevens’ approaches. 
Justice Kennedy’s approach to defining CWA jurisdiction over wetlands focused on 
the crucial concept from SWANCC: the “significant nexus” between a non-navigable water 
or wetland and the navigable waters.145 As Justice Kennedy put it, the “wetland must pos-
sess a ‘significant nexus’ to waters that are or were navigable in fact or that could reason-
ably be so made.”146 According to Justice Kennedy, such a significant nexus would exist 
“if the wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, 
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters 
more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”147 
In those terms, Justice Kennedy’s understanding of “significant nexus” seemed com-
patible with Justice Scalia’s understanding in the sense that both emphasized the necessity 
of a tangible, physical connection between the navigable waters and any other environ-
mental feature that could be regulated under the CWA. But Justice Kennedy explicitly 
rejected the requirement for a significant nexus that Justice Scalia had identified.148 He 
concluded that any requirement of a constantly flowing surface water connection had been 
precluded by Riverside Bayview.149 In his reading of Riverside Bayview, it was irrelevant 
whether wetlands share water with adjacent bodies of water so long as the wetlands sig-
nificantly affect the ecosystem in which the navigable water belongs.150 In other words, 
                                                          
 142. Id. at 788. 
 143. Id. at 792-93 (citing Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 123, 131-33). 
 144.  Id. at 792-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 145. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 
531 U.S. at 167-68). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 780. 
 148. Id. at 772. 
 149. Id. at 772-73. 
 150. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 772-73.   
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Justice Kennedy thought that a “significant nexus” could be established by any of a num-
ber of factors beyond a regularly flowing surface water connection – adjacency, connec-
tion through an ecosystem, and perhaps others.151 
Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy concluded that an intermittently flowing 
body of water could provide the requisite “significant nexus” between a wetland and the 
navigable waters.152 According to his reading of the CWA, Justice Kennedy concluded 
that Congress had not excluded such irregular flows from the “waters of the United 
States.”153 In this connection, Justice Kennedy specifically rejected Justice Scalia’s defi-
nition of “point source” as a primarily intermittent flow of water, and therefore he rejected 
Justice Scalia’s conclusion about the significance of this definition for understanding the 
meaning of the broader term, “waters of the United States.”154 In particular, he rejected 
the plurality opinion’s reasoning that, because a point source must possess an intermittent 
flow, the waters of the United States must be strictly characterized by a continuous flow. 
Justice Kennedy found this to be an unwarranted negative inference.155 
Like Justice Stevens, and unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy thought that the 
determination of whether a particular wetland would meet these criteria was a decision for 
the Army Corps, to be made on a case-by-case basis.156 The amount of deference that the 
agency would get in making this determination was not entirely clear from Justice Ken-
nedy’s analysis. On the one hand, he seemed to acknowledge the Army Corps’ authority 
to make regulations that defined what a significant nexus could be. But, at the same time, 
he also seemed to suggest that, at least under the existing regulations, the Army Corps’ 
answer to the question of whether a wetland would have a significant nexus to the naviga-
ble waters was subject to fairly extensive judicial scrutiny. Such ambiguity was apparent 
when Justice Kennedy wrote: 
When the Corps seeks to regulate wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact 
waters, it may rely on adjacency to establish its jurisdiction. Absent more 
specific regulations, however, the Corps must establish a significant 
nexus on a case-by-case basis when it seeks to regulate wetlands based 
on adjacency to non-navigable tributaries. Given the potential over-
breadth of the Corps’ regulations, this showing is necessary to avoid un-
reasonable applications of the statute. Where an adequate nexus is estab-
lished for a particular wetland, it may be permissible, as a matter of 
administrative convenience or necessity, to presume covered status for 
other comparable wetlands in the region.157 
                                                          
 151. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 152. Id. at 769-70. 
 153. Id. at 770. 
 154. Id. at 771-72. 
 155. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 772. As Justice Kennedy explained: 
Nothing in the point-source definition requires an intermittent flow. Polluted water could flow night and day 
from a pipe, channel, or conduit and yet still qualify as a point source; any contrary conclusion would likely 
exclude, among other things, effluent streams from sewage treatment plants. As a result, even were the statute 
read to require continuity of flow for navigable waters, certain water bodies could conceivably constitute both a 
point source and a water. At any rate, as the dissent observes, the fact that point sources may carry continuous 
flow undermines the plurality’s conclusion that covered “waters” under the Act may not be discontinuous. 
 156. Id. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 157. Id.   
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In light of the analytical differences among the three opinions in Rapanos, and given 
the fact that no single analytical approach commanded five votes, it is extremely difficult 
to identify the holding. The simplest way to do so would be to follow the Supreme Court’s 
own guidance about how to interpret its divided rulings. That guidance came in Marks v. 
United States,158 where the Court held that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and 
no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of 
the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred on the 
narrowest grounds.’”159 But there is no significant commonality among any of the opin-
ions in Rapanos. Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy appear to agree that the statutory lan-
guage is the principal authority determining when a wetland can qualify as one of the 
“waters of the United States.” But Justice Kennedy is willing to defer to the Army Corps, 
to some extent, when it comes to making this determination.  Justice Stevens agrees with 
Justice Kennedy about deferring to the agency’s interpretation; but Justice Stevens would 
follow Chevron principles in making that deference, and Justice Kennedy’s opinion does 
not indicate that he would be quite so deferential. In the end, there is no core of common 
principles that unites five Justices and that would permit a meaningful analysis of when a 
wetland is within the jurisdiction of the CWA. 
In his dissenting opinion in Rapanos, Justice Stevens seemed to recognize the diffi-
culty posed by the Court’s internal disagreements, and he suggested an approach that 
would not require a common core of principles for determining whether the Army Corps 
has the authority under the CWA to regulate a wetland. Justice Stevens suggested that 
lower courts should find jurisdiction under the CWA if either the plurality’s test or Justice 
Kennedy’s test was satisfied.160 As Justice Stevens saw it, if a wetland would meet the 
plurality’s test, it would certainly meet Justice Kennedy’s test.161 
D. Post-Rapanos Caselaw Regarding the Scope of Federal Authority 
Case law decided after Rapanos demonstrates that there is no clear rule governing 
the application of the CWA to wetlands. A number of cases follow Justice Kennedy’s 
approach, and, many of these courts employ the Marks method for deriving a holding from 
Rapanos’ fractured ruling.162 Other courts have followed Justice Stevens’ suggestion of 
an “either/or” test that used both the approach of the plurality and the approach set forth 
in Justice Kennedy’s opinion.163 
In United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc.,164 the Seventh Circuit applied Rapanos, 
although not in a wetlands case. That case arose from the unpermitted discharge of pollu-
tants into waters by Gerke Excavating, Inc.165
 
To determine if the waters were covered by 
                                                          
 158. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
 159. Id.. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976)). 
 160. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 161. Id.   
 162. See United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221-22 (11th Cir. 2007); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of 
Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724-
25 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 163. See United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 164. United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006) 
 165. Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 723. 
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the CWA, the Seventh Circuit applied Rapanos for the first time.166 Applying the Marks 
analysis for fractured Supreme Court opinions, the Seventh Circuit held that Justice Ken-
nedy’s significant nexus test was the controlling rationale in Rapanos because it was the 
“narrowest” grounds for decision.167 In this connection, the Seventh Circuit concluded 
that “narrowest” meant imposing the smallest restriction on the scope of federal author-
ity.168 The court also made an interesting observation about the differences between the 
plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy’s opinion, noting that in cases in which a “slight 
surface hydrological connection” could be found, Justice Kennedy’s test would not find 
federal jurisdiction, though eight other Justices would find federal jurisdiction.169 
In Northern California River Watch v. City of Healdsburg,170 the Ninth Circuit fol-
lowed Justice Kennedy’s approach. This case arose from facts similar to those in Gerke 
Excavating: the discharging of sewage into Basalt Pond, which is adjacent to the Russian 
River, a navigable water.171 Without much analysis, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Sev-
enth Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Gerke Excavating to conclude that Justice 
Kennedy’s test was “the narrowest ground to which a majority of the Justices would assent 
if forced to choose in almost all cases.”172 
The Eleventh Circuit applied Rapanos in United States v. Robison.173 As with the 
preceding Seventh and Ninth Circuit cases, the defendant in Robison violated a permit by 
discharging pollutants from undesignated points in its plant in Birmingham, Alabama.174  
Like the preceding courts, the Robison Court applied Marks and concluded that Justice 
Kennedy’s test controlled.175 In this connection, the court pointed out that courts may look 
to concurring opinions when interpreting a plurality opinion because concurring opinions 
have joined in the Court’s decision.176 It also followed the Seventh Circuit in determining 
that Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test is the narrowest one because it will make the 
smallest incursion on federal authority and thereby impose the least limitation on the scope 
of the CWA’s application.177 
The First Circuit departed from this trend in United States v. Johnson,178 adopting 
Justice Stevens’ either/or approach to applying the reasoning of the Rapanos plurality and 
concurrence. In that case, a group of Massachusetts cranberry farmers released pollutants 
into three wetlands that were hydrologically connected to the Weweantic River.179 The 
First Circuit decided that Rapanos was the controlling authority for the jurisdictional issue, 
but the more difficult question for the court was how that case would apply.180 
                                                          
 166. Id. at 724. 
 167. Id. (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)). 
 168. Id. at 724-25. 
 169. Id. at 725. 
 170. N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007) 
 171. Id. at 995. 
 172. Id. at 999. 
 173. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208. 
 174. Id. at 1211-12. 
 175. Id. at 1222. 
 176. Id. at 1221. 
 177. Id. at 1221-22. 
 178. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64. 
 179. Id. at 57. 
 180. Id. at 62-64. 
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After considering the Marks analysis at length, the First Circuit determined that its 
method was not particularly useful because there was no real “narrowest ground” among 
any of the opinions.181 Indeed, the First Circuit noted that the concept of “narrowest 
ground” was elusive, even in the best of circumstances.182 As the court noted, “narrowest 
ground” could mean, as the Seventh Circuit concluded, the ground that is least restrictive 
of federal authority, but it could also mean the ground that is least restrictive of non-federal 
interest.183 By the same token, it could mean the ground that is “more closely tailored to 
the specific situation confronting the court.”184 
Turning away from Marks, the First Circuit followed what it called the “common 
sense approach to fragmented opinions.”185 In had found this approach in a Second Circuit 
opinion, Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,186 which held that the court must “find [the] com-
mon ground shared by five or more justices,” not simply the single opinion in which a 
majority of justices joined.187 According to this method, a lower court confronted with a 
fragment Supreme Court opinion must find “a legal standard which, when applied, will 
necessarily produce results with which a majority of the Court from that case would 
agree.”188 
When it applied this method, the First Circuit concluded that Justice Stevens’s either/
or test would most often reach the result that would command the assent of a majority of 
the members of the Rapanos Court.189 The First Circuit noted that this test would solve 
the problem that was identified—but left unresolved—by the Seventh Circuit in Gerke 
Excavating.190 
The Fifth Circuit also used Justice Stevens’ either/or method, albeit for different 
reasons, in United States v. Lucas.191 There, a Mississippi property owner who anticipated 
selling parcels of his land to mobile home owners had installed septic systems on his prop-
erty, in accordance with county ordinances.192 The land included wetlands that were con-
nected to the Bayou Costapia, the Tchoutacabouffa River, and eventually the Gulf of Mex-
ico.193 The Fifth Circuit affirmed jury instructions that reflected elements of both Justice 
Kennedy’s significant nexus test and the plurality opinion’s test that focused on a contin-
uous surface water connection.194 These instructions required the jury to find that the wet-
lands in question were waters of the United States if they contained a significant nexus 
with adjacent navigable waters such that the wetlands had a notable effect on the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the navigable waters.195 In addition, in making this 
                                                          
 181. Id.   
 182. Id.   
 183.  Johnson, 467 F.3d at 62-64. 
 184.  Id. at 63 (citing Johnson v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir.)). 
 185.  Id. at 64. 
 186. Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176 (2nd Cir. 1992). 
 187. Id. at 1182. 
 188. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64-65. 
 189. Id.   
 190. Id.   
 191. United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 192. Id. at 322. 
 193. Id. at 324-25. 
 194. Id. at 324-25. 
 195. Id. at 323-24. 
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finding, the jury was allowed to take into consideration the “flow rate of surface water 
between the wetlands” and the navigable waters.196 
All of these different approaches show that Rapanos did little to clarify the law.  
Nearly a decade after it was decided, the lower courts are still uncertain about the extent 
of CWA jurisdiction over wetlands. And they are equally uncertain about the proper ap-
proach to interpreting the statute. 
IV. THE NEW REGULATIONS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH CASE LAW AND PRINCIPLES OF 
FEDERALISM 
The new regulations promulgated by the EPA and the Army Corps in 2015 were a 
long-awaited response to the uncertainly left in the wake of the divided analyses and opin-
ions in Rapanos. But the new regulations proved controversial. In particular, they inspired 
opposition because they seemed to embrace the expansive conception of CWA jurisdic-
tion, which had been severely criticized in SWANCC and the plurality opinion in Rapanos. 
The strongest arguments against the regulations are reflected by the allegations made by 
Ohio and Michigan in their challenge to the implementation of those regulations. 
In their complaint for injunctive relief, Ohio and Michigan alleged that the new def-
inition of “waters of the United States” was inconsistent with SWANCC because it would 
apply to “isolated, intrastate waters,” which SWANCC ruled could not be included in the 
definition of “waters of the United States.”197 They also alleged that the proposed regula-
tions were inconsistent with important principles shared by both the plurality and concur-
ring opinions in Rapanos.198 In particular, they contended that, when viewed together, the 
plurality and concurring opinions prohibited the extension of CWA jurisdiction over wet-
lands that were remote from bodies of navigable water and were adjacent only to remote 
and insubstantial ditches and drains.199 Moreover, they maintained that the new regula-
tions were based upon principles articulated by the dissenting opinion in Rapanos and 
therefore were inconsistent with the controlling legal prinicples set forth in that opinion 
and in preceding opinions such as SWANCC and Riverside Bayview.200 As the states as-
serted in their complaint: 
[T]he Rule appears informed far more by the dissent in Rapanos than by 
the four-Justice plurality or Justice Kennedy’s concurrence: indeed, De-
fendants’ Technical Support Document (at pages 37-40) in its introduc-
tory discussion of “Supreme Court Decisions” devotes five paragraphs 
and two and one-half pages to a fulsome discussion of the Rapanos dis-
sent, while giving just one short-shrift paragraph each (and a total of one 
page) to the plurality and the Kennedy concurrence.201 
In arguing that the new regulations exceeded existing federal authority, Ohio and 
Michigan emphasized that the scope of federal power to prevent pollution was limited by 
                                                          
 196.  Lucas, 516 F.3d at 324. 
 197. Id. at ¶¶ 32-33. 
 198. Id. at ¶¶ 35-42. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at ¶¶ 33-34. 
 201.  Lucas, 516 F.3d at ¶ 34. 
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the principle that the regulation of intrastate land is quintessentially a matter of state 
power.202 The states took the position that the new regulations extended federal power to 
many areas of intrastate land that were not actually adjacent to waters that had been tradi-
tionally subject to federal regulation.203 Thus, the states contended that the new regula-
tions were not within the scope of the authority created by the CWA and were not con-
sistent with the constitutional limits on federal power.204 Thus, they asserted causes of 
action for a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act205 and the Tenth Amend-
ment.206 
In making its initial ruling in the case, the Sixth Circuit seemed persuaded by the 
arguments against the regulation.207 Responding to the challengers’ arguments that the 
new regulation was unlawful in both substantive and procedural terms, the Sixth Circuit 
held: 
[W]e conclude that petitioners have demonstrated a substantial possibil-
ity of success on the merits of their claims. Petitioners first claim that 
the Rule’s treatment of tributaries, “adjacent waters,” and waters having 
a “significant nexus” to navigable waters is at odds with the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Rapanos, where the Court vacated the Sixth Circuit’s 
upholding of wetlands regulation by the Army Corps of Engineers. Even 
assuming, for present purposes, as the parties do, that Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion in Rapanos represents the best instruction on the permissible 
parameters of “waters of the United States” as used in the Clean Water 
Act, it is far from clear that the new Rule’s distance limitations are har-
monious with the instruction. 
Moreover, the rulemaking process by which the distance limitations 
were adopted is facially suspect. Petitioners contend the proposed rule 
that was published, on which interested persons were invited to com-
ment, did not include any proposed distance limitations in its use of 
terms like “adjacent waters” and significant nexus.” Consequently, pe-
titioners contend, the Final Rule cannot be considered a “logical out-
growth” of the rule proposed, as required to satisfy the notice-and-com-
ment requirements of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553. See Long Island Care 
at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 174, 127 S. Ct. 2339, 168 L. Ed. 
2d 54 (2007). As a further consequence of this defect, petitioners con-
tend, the record compiled by respondents is devoid of specific scientific 
support for the distance limitations that were included in the Final Rule. 
They contend the Rule is therefore not the product of reasoned decision-
making and is vulnerable to attack as impermissibly “arbitrary or capri-
cious” under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).208 
                                                          
 202. Id. at ¶¶ 42-49. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at ¶¶ 45-50. 
 205. Id. at ¶¶ 51-58. 
 206.  Lucas, 516 F.3d at ¶¶ 59-62, 
 207. Ohio, 803 F.3d at 807. 
 208. Id. 
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On this basis, the Sixth Circuit ordered that the new regulations be stayed pending 
further review.209 This analysis by the Sixth Circuit, however brief, buttresses the idea that 
those who challenge the new regulatory definitions have a strong case to make. 
The best argument against the new regulations is that they are simply inconsistent 
with the main line of case law interpreting the CWA, and, in particular, with SWANCC 
and the concept of the “significant nexus” that was outlined there. The crucial analytical 
point made in SWANCC was that the CWA jurisdiction is limited to “waters” with a sub-
stantial and tangible physical connection with the navigable waters.210 This point was 
based upon the entire line of cases involving questions about the scope of federal authority 
to regulate water resources.211 An intangible or intermittent connection through an aquatic 
ecosystem is simply not enough to serve as a basis for a federal intrusion into an area 
traditionally reserved for state and local regulation.212 
But the new regulations provide for just such intangible or intermittent ecosystem 
connections.213 By explicitly asserting federal jurisdiction over ephemeral streams, inter-
mittent water flows, or even areas that are only within a 100-year floodplain of the navi-
gable waters, the new regulations base significant elements of federal jurisdiction entirely 
on the kind of ecosystem connections that were ruled insufficient in SWANCC.  The same 
principles and analysis that led to the invalidation of the Migratory Bird Rule in SWANCC 
also undermine the validity of the new regulations. 
Despite the disparity of analytical approaches in Rapanos, these essential principles 
from SWANCC and before remain untouched. There is certainly no doubt that Justice 
Scalia’s plurality opinion emphasized the important of regularly flowing surface water 
connections as the sine qua non of CWA jurisdiction.214 Although Justice Kennedy’s con-
currence concluded that CWA jurisdiction was not quite so limited as Justice Scalia would 
have had it, he retained focus on the importance of the “significant nexus” and reaffirmed 
the dispositive principles of SWANCC.215 Although Justice Kennedy’s analysis left some 
room for agencies to identify what constituted a “significant nexus,” there is nothing in his 
opinion to suggest that he embraced the same level of deference to agency decision-mak-
ing advocated by Justice Stevens in his dissent or that he was willing to tolerate an agency 
interpretation that was squarely at odds with SWANCC. In other words, although Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence identified a slightly broader meaning for “significant nexus” than 
Justice Scalia’s plurality, it was still based on the principles of SWANCC that forbid the 
establishment of CWA jurisdiction on intangible ecosystem connections. 
In fact, the new regulations seem entirely based upon the approach advocated by 
Justice Stevens’ dissent. Most notably, they presume that Justice Stevens prevailed when 
advocating for extensive deference to agency findings about when a “water” had a signif-
icant nexus with the navigable waters; as Ohio and Michigan point out in their complaint, 
                                                          
 209. Id. 
 210.  Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 531 U.S. at 172-73. 
 211. See supra § III. 
 212. See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 531 U.S. at 172-73. 
 213. See supra § III. 
 214. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 734-35. 
 215. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, 531 U.S. at 
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the EPA’s and Army Corps’ guidance on the new regulations rely heavily on the dissenting 
opinion in Rapanos and barely mention the plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy’s con-
currence at all.216 The agencies are rather aggressive in asserting their authority to interpret 
the CWA and to extend federal jurisdiction to areas it has never invaded before, even 
though Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion is the first and only authority supporting the 
idea that the agencies should have such sweeping discretionary authority. 
Not only do the new regulations exceed the legal boundaries defined by established 
law, they also comprise important principles of federalism. Because they would extend 
federal jurisdiction over areas with 100-year floodplains, they will give the federal gov-
ernment the potential to control land and water use in virtually every corner of every state. 
Indeed, when combined with the agencies’ self-appointed discretionary authority, the new 
regulations could make the EPA and the Army Corps the primary arbiters of whether any 
new development or land use should go forward. There is simply no precedent in American 
law for such a compromise of powers traditionally conferred upon state and local govern-
ments. Moreover, state and local governments are simply better suited to make land use 
decisions that take into account all relevant factors, not just environmental ones. Simply 
put, the CWA is not—and was not intended to be—and instrument for making water pol-
lution control the pre-eminent consideration in all matters of land use and development in 
every corner of the nation. 
CONCLUSION 
One of the core principles of federalism is that a division of authority between the 
state and federal governments is essential to assure both fair and efficient government.  
The newly proposed regulatory definition of “waters of the United States” compromises 
these principles because it would give the federal government essentially unlimited power 
to regulate land and water use. This expansion of federal authority is not only inconsistent 
with constitutional principles, but is also inconsistent with the body of law that developed 
surrounding the scope of federal authority to regulate water use, which has developed both 
before and after the enactment of the CWA. Under that body of law, the “waters of the 
United States” have always been understood to consist of those bodies of water that are or 
can be navigated, along with any tributaries that have a substantial, physical connection to 
such bodies of water. This definition of “waters of the United States” leaves room for the 
states to assume their traditional role of regulating land and water use, while permitting 
the federal government to protect those resources of genuinely national scope. Because the 
CWA is limited to the regulation of the “waters of the United States,” and because the new 
regulations would greatly expand the scope of federal authority beyond the established 
definition of “waters of the United States,” those new regulations are unlawful and should 
be overturned. 
Those who support the new regulatory definition of “waters of the United States” 
may argue that this expansive definition is necessary to protect the entire ecosystem that 
supports the biological integrity of the navigable waters. This may well be true, but the 
Clean Water Act was not drafted as legislation for the protection of aquatic ecosystems.  
                                                          
 216. Complaint, supra note 25, at ¶ 34. 
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As its language unequivocally demonstrates, it was drafted for the purpose of preventing 
the flow of pollution into the navigable waters. If the protection of aquatic ecosystems is 
an important national policy objective, it should be the subject of its own legislation, 
drafted on the basis of language that is not fraught with the limitations inherent in the 
concept of “waters of the United States.” 
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